Because of its inherent stealth, a Trident battleship would have little need for such defensive weapons. This considerably reduces their inventory of offensive strike missiles. Fleet surface combatants must distribute their missile loads to address a variety of missions that include antisubmarine, antiair, and missile defense operations. As this threat matures, Tridents with Tomahawks would offer the following major advantages.įirepower and range. In such an environment, access to forward bases will become increasingly problematic, and even surface combatants operating in the littoral could become highly vulnerable.

forces did on a large scale eight years ago in the Gulf War: monitor large fixed targets (such as ports, air bases, and major supply dumps) in their region and strike them with a high confidence of destruction. In short, as ballistic and cruise missile technologies continue to diffuse and as access to space-based reconnaissance and imagery expands, a growing number of militaries will be able to do what U.S. It is an area-denial threat whose defeat or negation will become the single most crucial element in projecting and sustaining U.S. This is more than a sea-denial threat or a Navy problem. “I anticipate that the next century will see those foes striving to target concentrations of troops and materiél ashore and attack our forces at sea and in the air. “It has become evident that proliferating weapons and information technologies will enable our foes to attack the ports and airfields needed for the forward deployment of our land-based forces,” Admiral Jay Johnson, the chief of naval operations, has observed.

The reasons have to do with the changing nature of naval warfare and the increasing vulnerabilities of U.S. Why should the Navy consider converting Tridents, at a cost of about $500 million per ship, to a new use? After all, the Navy already has Tomahawks aboard other surface combatants and is planning to build the DD-21 land attack destroyer that, as its name indicates, will focus its efforts on striking targets ashore. A battle group composed of carrier-based aircraft, conventional precision-strike missiles aboard surface combatants and submarines, and Trident stealth battleships, all linked by advanced information technologies, would provide the United States with an extraordinarily potent punch. Indeed, they would have far greater long-range striking power than the battleships that conducted Tomahawk strike operations during the Persian Gulf War. These converted Tridents could prowl the world’s oceans as the Navy’s first “stealth” battleships, capable of inflicting more prompt damage at extended ranges and at lower risk to the combatant submarine and its crew than any warship in the fleet, all without forfeiting the advantage of surprise.

The Navy should seize this opportunity and convert the Tridents into conventional missile carriers capable of firing 150 or more Tomahawks. The increased importance of Tomahawks is occurring as the Navy considers what to do with four Trident ballistic missile submarines that are slated for decommissioning even though they have at least 20 years of service life left in them. These precision-guided missiles have greater range than carrier-based aircraft and can be employed without risking pilots and their expensive planes. During the Cold War, when presidents were informed of a budding crisis, it is said that they often first asked “Where are the carriers?” In the post-Cold War era, the first question they may very well now be asking is “Where are the Tomahawks?” Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles (technically called Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles) have become the weapons of choice for maritime strike operations, especially initial strike operations, during the past 10 years.

Us carrier battle group cost